In order to study the balance relation between individual interests and its negative effects, based on a simple rational pigs game to allow robbing food whose negative game system is given by the axiomatic method.
INTRODUCTION
Based on famous experiment of two psychologists, Baldwin and Meese (1979); Rasmusen (1989) introduced an example in his book on game theory called Boxed Pigs. John (1992) rewrote Boxed Pigs as Rational Pigs. But he wrote a new story. Susan (1996) said that "The big pig can run faster and eat faster than the little pig, so the little pig knows it will do better if it gets to the dispenser before the big pig" (p.701). Fabac et al. (2014) created a rational game extended (RPGE), in which the introduction of a third glutton entails significant structural changes. Based on situation analysis of double action games with entropy, e.g., ; ; ; ; Jiang (2011); and ; ; ; Jiang (2013) ; Jiang et al. (2013) and Jiang et al. (2014) used axiomatic method to research timing K-systems, K=0,1. Finally, the method to change a game among many pigs (can be infinitely many) into a game between a big pig and a small pig and applicable degree of the method are given. defines that a formal game is called the negative game of another one if sum of their payoff functions is equal to zero. In the negative boxed pigs game (or rational pigs game) is relative to 0-peace system in . Li et al. (2015) gave an axiomatic system of boxed pigs (or rational pigs) game, i.e., a boxed pigs game (or rational pigs game) to allow robbing food.
In this paper, we try to research negative game of the game given by Li et al. (2015) and we will give an application to website management. The organization of this paper is follows. In section 2, our new game model will be given, either pig's inhaling poisonous gas quantities theorem will be proved, and some basic inequalities will be given. Set of pure Nash equilibria in this game will be discussed in section 3, which is divided into the two cases with and without supervision mechanism. In section 4, we want to introduce public welfare function on the game.
How should a "government" let public welfare function take the greatest value and activate social members' labor enthusiasm? That will be discussed in section 5. Finally, in section 6, an application example to website management will be given.
MODEL AND PIG P'S INHALING POISONOUS GAS QUANTITIES THEOREM
By imitating Section 1.5 in we give another model as follows. In a sealed room within air, one pig P and one pig Q are put in two mesh cages. There is a trough in each cage and c unit of pig food are in each trough. The two cages close to the left wall and right wall of the room respectively. Two spray nozzles are installed on the two walls, which are close to the cages.
When the pig P eats is food, q units of poisonous gas A erupt from the spray nozzle close the pig P. When the pig Q eats its food, q units of poisonous gas B erupt from the spray nozzle close the pig Q. We assume units of pig food and units of the poisonous gas are converted into an appropriate equivalent and qc  , and similarly for the following statement. When the two pigs eat their own food at the same time, q units of poisonous gas A erupt from the spray nozzle close the pig P and q units of B does from Q. The kind of gas emitted by all two nozzles is the same, but the spread velocity of the gas differs. Suppose the spread velocities of the poisonous gases are and respectively. The pig P inhales units of poisonous gas in one time unit, and the pig Q inhales Q v units of poisonous gas in one time unit. The distance between the two pigs is d. The quantity of the poisonous gas inhaled by the pig P is P units, T units, and Q units, respectively, when the pig P eats his food alone, the two pigs eat their food at the same time, and the pig Q eats his food alone. Now let us give a basic assumption: The pig P to eat alone is favorable to himself and the quantity of the poisonous gas inhaled by him is less than the quantity of the poisonous gas erupted out, i.e., .
Theorem 2.1 (Pig P's Inhaling Poisonous Gas Quantities Theorem) The pig P's inhaling poisonous gas quantities are
When the pig P eats alone, the two pigs eat at the same time, and the pig Q eats alone respectively.
Proof:
(1) When the pig P eats alone, it inhales poisonous gas A at once. The poisonous gas A need time to spread to the pig B. By this time, the pig P has inhaled Therefore, the quantity of poisonous gas inhaled by the pig P is
(2 )
(3) When the pig Q eats alone, q units of poisonous gas B is sprayed out from the spray nozzle close to the pig Q and the pig Q inhales it at once. Poisonous gas B needs time to spread to the pig P. By this time, the pig Q has inhaled QQ dv u units. There are still units in the room. The remaining poisonous gases are inhaled by both pigs together. Therefore, the quantity of poisonous gas inhaled by the pig P is T, and Q are written as b, t and s to stand for that the big pig's inhaling poisonous gas quantities when the big pig eats alone, the two pigs eat at the same time, and the small pig eats at alone, respectively. Where b, t, and s are prefixes of the words "big", "two", and "small" respectively. 
（2-2
） Remark: Theorem 1 (The big pig's incomes) in Li et al. (2015) gave us the following result.
The big pig's incomes are the follows when he alone presses his own panel, when the two pigs press their own panels together, and when the small pig alone presses his own panel, respectively.
When that s b u u u  , the above formulas are simplified as (2-2). This shows that when s b u u u  our new game is a negative game of that in Li et al. (2015) . Proof: Those basic inequalities can be obtained by the following inequalities.
SET OF PURE NASH EQUILIBRIA

Games without Supervision Mechanism
The game is said to be without supervision mechanism if the two pigs' behaviors are not interposed.
In the following matrix, the big pig's actions are denoted by row and the small pig's by column. The first row denotes the big pig eating and the second row denotes the big pig not eating. Similarly, the first column denotes the small pig eating and the second column denotes the small pig not eating. Theorem 3.1 tells us that each of two pigs will eat, which is careless of the consequences, if there is no supervision mechanism. Therefore the two pigs' behaviors must be supervised in order to maintain a benign state of the system.
Games with Supervision Mechanism
Suppose a pig to discharge poisonous gas should be punished q  units. Where 0   is said to be a punishment coefficient and q  is said to be poisoning punishment quantity (or briefly, PPQ). We suppose also a pig to inhales poisonous gas should be compensated q (1 )(2 ) (1 )(
Thus we can obtain (1 ) 0, (1 ) 0, 
={(eating, not eating), (not eating, not eating)} by imitating
(1). 
={(not eating, not eating)} by imitating (1). Q.E.D.
Theorem 3.2 tells us that the stable situation of a game with supervision mechanism can be adjusted. A regulator can let pigs' strategy selection change into an expected one by some methods. However, a regulator should find maximization of the two pigs' benefits.
PUBLIC WELFARE FUNCTION
The total benefit created by the two pigs brings positive effect to the public welfare of two pigs but discharging poisonous gas brings negative effect to that. It is obvious that each pig hates Since regulators' function is to let public welfare function of the two pigs taking its greatest value, the public welfare function about the situation (not eating, not eating) has no meaning.
Based on this, we consider only the two cases as follows.
(1) Public welfare function with type (eating, eating)
(2) Public welfare function with type (eating, not eating) (1) is (eating, eating) , and the unique pure Nash equilibrium of the case (2) and on the other hand, we can obtain that 12 ( ) ( )
At this time, the two pigs' public welfare function has the greatest value.
The inverse proposition can be proved by the similar method.
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(2) It can be proved by imitating the case (1). Q.E.D.
Theorem 4.1 tells us the fact. If poisoning punishment quantity is more than the quantity of food eaten, then the two pigs' public welfare function is the greatest one when either (1) the inhaled compensation quantity is higher and the aversion index about poisonous gas is lower, or (2) the inhaled compensation quantity is moderate and the aversion index about poisonous gas is higher. 
ADJUSTMENT AND SETTING OF PARAMETERS
When the Aversion Index about Poisonous Gas is Lower
(1) Adjusting compensation coefficient  : By Theorem 4.1, each pig to eat his food lets public welfare function be the greatest only if compensation coefficient  is greater than q c q s qs 
Theorem 5.1 shows the fact. Ones can use the method of deducing poisoning punishment quantity to adjust the big pig eating alone to both eating and to let public welfare be optimal. 
Therefore it can be obtained that
As a result, we have
However, it contradicts the condition that the two pigs are not very sensitive to the poisonous gas. Q.E.D.
When the Aversion Index about Poisonous Gas is Higher
We have the two methods as follows. 
(2) Decreasing punishment coefficient  :
Proof: By the condition, it can be obtained that Let ' k and '  be replaced by k and respectively, both (5-4) and (5-5) can be obtained.
Sufficiency:
Let the two pigs dislike the poisonous gas and let both (5-4) and (5-5) be satisfied.
Let k and be replaced by ' k and ' 
